The Interrelationship of Collective Bargaining at Industry and Company-Levels in Wage Determination by Castel, Nicolas et al.
 
Travail et Emploi 
Hors-série | 2015
2015 Special Edition
The Interrelationship of Collective Bargaining at
Industry and Company-Levels in Wage
Determination
L’articulation des négociations de branche et d’entreprise dans la détermination
des salaires







DARES - Ministère du Travail
Printed version
Date of publication: 30 December 2015




Nicolas Castel, Noélie Delahaie and Héloïse Petit, « The Interrelationship of Collective Bargaining at
Industry and Company-Levels in Wage Determination », Travail et Emploi [Online], Hors-série | 2015,
Online since 30 December 2015, connection on 01 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
travailemploi/6804  ; DOI : 10.4000/travailemploi.6804 
© La documentation française
2015 Special Edition – Travail et Emploi –  31
The Interrelationship of Collective Bargaining  
at Industry and Company-Levels 
in Wage Determination
*
Nicolas Castel**, Noélie Delahaie***, Héloïse Petit****
The combined increase in firm or company-level and industry-level collective 
bargaining over recent decades in France has renewed the debate over the 
potential complementarity or the substitution effect between the two bar-
gaining levels. In this article we study how the two bargaining levels are 
associated at the workplace level in France in the wage determination process. 
Our study is based on the REPONSE 2004-2005 survey –which provides 
information on the role given to industry-level bargaining and the current 
process of negotiations in the workplace– and on two case studies: one in the 
automotive sector, the other in call service centres. Three company profiles 
are defined. In the first two profiles, one of the two bargaining levels has 
greater emphasis than the other while the third profile is characterised by 
the weakness of negotiations, whatever the level. Whatever the profile, our 
analysis shows that the content of negotiations is different at each bargaining 
level –the company level being more focused on wage determination and the 
branch level on wage regulation. Besides these key levels of collective bar-
gaining, we stress the growing influence in wage determination of individual 
performance interviews within the company, and of third parties such as the 
prime contractor or the parent company, outside the firm.
* Translation: Nathaniel London.  
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The French wage regulation system based on collective bargaining at the industry level was established by the Popular Front and developed rapidly following the 
Second World War in the context of the law of 19 February 1950.1 For three decades, 
these negotiations together with the state’s supervision of the statutory minimum 
wage were the framework for decisions in setting wages. Company-level collective 
bargaining developed following the granting of full rights for trade union activity at 
the company level by the law of 27 December 1968 (which opened the possibility 
of creating local union sections in companies with more than 50 employees) and 
especially with the introduction of mandatory annual negotiations by the Auroux laws 
of 1982 (BEVORT, JOBERT, 2011; LE CROM, 2003). The number of company-level 
agreements increased continuously from the early 1980s, as reflected in the annual 
reports of collective bargaining published by the Ministry of Labour: the number of 
company agreements rose from 3,972 agreements listed in 1984 to 33,869 in 2011.2 
The period in which the signing of a company-level agreement at Renault led to heated 
debates –in 1955, and therefore outside of the legal framework– seems to be of the 
distant past today (JOBERT, 2000).
French industrial relations studies from the late 1980s suggest the hypothesis of 
a weakening of the predominance of industry-level agreements in favour of agree-
ments concluded at the company level. This hypothesis raises the question of the 
complementarity or substitutability of the two collective bargaining levels. However, 
this has never been directly addressed. While reference to weakening at the industry 
level more or less implies a hypothesis of the substitution of industry-level collective 
bargaining by those at the company level, their combined dynamics since the 2000s 
emphasize, on the contrary, their potential complementarity. The few studies linking 
the two remain focused on one or the other levels.3 Existing studies are mainly inter-
ested in how industry-level recommendations are seen and integrated in the workplace 
(JOBERT, ROZENBLATT, 1984; JOBERT, 2003; MEURS, 1996). While highlighting the 
variety of roles and relative importance that actors attribute to collective agreements 
at the industry level, they do not include an analysis of the development and issues 
1. In France companies combine into branches to organize multi-company collective bargaining. Branche members 
are defined by their affiliation to a constitutive agreement: the convention collective. Further industry-level collective 
agreements are riders to the convention collective. In principle, any company can affiliate to any convention collective 
but, in practice, conventions collectives, and corresponding branches, have developed in the context of industries. 
Therefore, in this text we will refer indiscriminately to branche-level or industry-level bargaining.
2. These statistics have some limitations on which we shall have occasion to return. Nevertheless, they illustrate 
a tendency which has also been confirmed by other sources, including the REPONSE survey (enquêtte Relations 
professionnelles et Négociations d'entreprise – Industrial Relations and Company-Level Collective Bargaining) 
(BLOCH-LONDON, PÉLISSE, 2008).
3. Studies generally relate to the industry level, which is symbolic of French industrial relations. Most of them base 
their analysis of the role of convention collective on the study of specific branches (EYRAUD et al., 1988), while 
others define branche profiles (SAGLIO, 1991, 2009; JOBERT, 2003). Analyses of the role of company negotiations in 
the industrial relations system have mainly been done by economists estimating their impact on real wages (MEURS, 
SKALLI, 1997; BRAHAMI, DANIEL, 2004). The analysis of companies’ industrial relations, based on the REPONSE 
survey, is an exception (AMOSSÉ et al., 2008).
2015 Special Edition – Travail et Emploi –  33
Collective Bargaining at Industry and Company-Levels
involved at company-level bargaining.4 In this article we consider the two negotiating 
levels together to study their interrelationship: do company and industry-level negotia-
tions have different weight in the company’s decisions? Are they different in their 
content? Is there consistency between the negotiated content and the weight given to 
the different levels?
One answer to these questions is provided by the “favourability principle” that 
governs the relationship between different levels by which rules and standards are 
produced (Article L. 2254-1 of the Labour Code). These range from the most general 
–the law– to the most specific –the employment contract– and include collective, that 
is industry-level, as well as company agreements. According to this principle, a lower 
level rule or standard can only modify a higher one if it improves it and, in case of 
dispute, judges will choose the standard that is most favourable to the employee. This 
“hierarchy of rules and standards” theoretically requires company agreements to be 
at least as favourable as industry-level agreements.
However, there is a gap between this principle and the reality. First, it is not 
always easy to define what situation is best for the employee. This is obvious in the 
proliferation of “give and take” agreements in which employees often waive some 
of their rights or benefits on behalf of the preservation of employment.5 In addition, 
several laws have introduced exceptions to the favourability principle, starting with the 
Auroux laws and continuing through to the law of 20 August 2008 which introduces 
possible exceptions for industry-level agreements on working time. There have been 
major changes in this body of law since the early 2000s. Finally, even the analysis of 
the operation of conventions collectives, their ability to generate rules or standards, 
demonstrates to what degree the idea of a system of strictly hierarchical institutions 
(JOBERT et al., 1993; LE CORRE, SAGLIO, 2007) must be qualified.
Studies in industrial relations by economists and sociologists propose two dif-
ferent approaches. The first one, found notably in the work of François SELLIER (1961, 
1993), sees the definition of collective bargaining levels and their interrelationship 
as related above all to the negotiating strategies of the different actors. The second 
approach views bargaining levels through the differentiation of their content (LOZIER, 
1993; SAGLIO, 1991). Jean SAGLIO for instance offers such a reading of the interrela-
tionship of different levels of bargaining specific to wage issues (SAGLIO, 1986, 1999, 
2007): on the one hand, branche-level agreements provide assessment benchmarks of 
rules and standards, while the company level, on the other hand, is the place to discuss 
wage rates. His work focuses on both the variety of contexts and histories marking 
each convention collective with specific rules and standards (SAGLIO, 1987, 1991, 
2009) and the exceptional stability of a “wage system” set up during the 20th century, 
4. The analysis of Dominique MEURS and Ali SKALLI (1997) is of interest because it explicitly addresses both points. 
They analyse the impact of company agreements on wages, controlling for the workplaces’ position in relation to the 
branche. But, like other studies, it does not analyse directly the relationship between the two levels of negotiations.
5. See, e.g., JOBERT (2010) on the distribution of this type of agreement in the case of company-level collective 
bargaining on working time; or DOCKÈS (2008) on the emergence of this type of agreement at the interindustry level.
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traces of which can be found at the end of the 19th. To examine the linkages between 
collective bargaining at the industry and the company-levels, is thus to investigate the 
duality distinguishing the roles of regulation from that of the determination of wages. 
We propose to examine the timeliness of this interpretation for three reasons.
First, since the early 1990s, several laws have resulted in –or aimed at– stimulating 
collective bargaining (BLOCH-LONDON, PÉLISSE, 2008; NABOULET, 2011). The public 
authorities have more or less directly encouraged collective bargaining. This involves 
the obligation to negotiate at company level, often annually, on certain themes such as 
actual wage benefits, working time, gender equality, and the Gestion prévisionnelle des 
emplois et des compétences (Jobs and Skills Forecast Management System – GPEC). 
It also involves financial incentives through the reduction of social contributions or, 
further upstream, changing the rules of collective bargaining, e.g., by relaxing the 
terms of the recourse to mandatement, (which allows a union to name or “mandate” 
an employee in the absence of a locally elected union representative). While these 
legislative changes focused on encouraging company-level collective bargaining, they 
might just as well create a positive momentum to collective bargaining at industry level. 
During the 2000s, the revaluation of the national statutory monthly minimum wage 
(Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance – SMIC) –principally related to 
the reduction of working time– also contributed to the revival of collective bargaining 
activity at industry level which had to negotiate branche-level minima which had been 
surpassed by the legal minimum wage (ANDRÉ, BREDA, 2011; DAYAN, NABOULET, 
2012).
The second motivation for this study is the creation and increased distribution 
of data on company and industry-level agreements and the introduction of a new 
codification of collective agreements by the Direction de l’animation de la recherche, 
des études et des statistiques (Department for the Coordination of Research, Studies 
and Statistics – DARES) (see below). While these sources have limitations, their 
development opens the way for a renewal of collective bargaining statistical analyses 
(AVOUYI-DOVI et al., 2009; CARLIER, NABOULET, 2009; NABOULET, 2011; ANDRÉ, 
BREDA, 2011; ANDRÉ, 2012; JAUNEAU, 2012).6
Finally, the decision to focus on wages is not only justified because they play 
a central role in the collective bargaining process (BARRAT, DANIEL, 2002), but also 
because of the profound changes in companies’ wage practices in recent decades, 
both in form (CASTEL, DELAHAIE, PETIT, 2011b) as well as in wage levels (DAYAN, 
NABOULET, 2012).
6. Only company agreements registered with the Directions départementales du travail, de l’emploi et de la formation 
professionnelle (Departmental Directorates for Labour, Employment and Vocational Training – DDTEFP) are taken 
into account. For some time, the low number of such agreements that were in fact reported has limited the statistical 
analysis of this data. But it seems that reporting such agreements is much more prevalent today, thus reinforcing the 
assumption of the completeness of the data. For a discussion of the contributions and limitations of databases on 
agreements, see BARRAT, DANIEL, (2002) and AVOUYI-DOVI et al., (2009).
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In this article, we investigate how companies interrelate industry and company-
level collective bargaining practices in determining their wage policies by relying on 
cross referencing of the REPONSE 2004-2005 survey and of two case studies (see 
Box 1). The first part presents the results of a typology of forms of wage regulation in 
BOX 1
The Data Used
The REPONSE 2004-2005 survey (enquête Relations professionnelles et négociations 
d’entreprise – Industrial Relations and Company-Level Collective Bargaining) is dedicated 
to the study of industrial relations in France (existence and functioning of employee rep-
resentative bodies, collective bargaining, conflicts, etc.). This survey of a representative 
sample of 2,930 workplaces in the non-agricultural private sector employing at least 
20 employees, compares the views of actors by interviewing a representative of man-
agement, an employees’ representative (when there is one) and a sample of employees. We 
have only used the “management representatives” questionnaire in this article. It contains 
questions regarding the latest wage negotiations (what discussions or collective bargaining 
sessions took place, the topics negotiated, the role of industry-level recommendations, etc.) 
and the state of industrial relations in the workplace (presence of employee representatives, 
the rate of unionization, etc.). It also includes a series of questions providing information 
on the characteristics of the establishment (characteristics of the workforce, size of the 
workplace, the company’s affiliation to a business group, etc.) and economic position 
(market share and its evolution, etc.).
Two case studies are used to extend and deepen the results of the statistical analysis. 
They were conducted between February and August 2010, in companies which belong to 
very different industries: the automotive industry and call service centres. The choice of 
companies was not designed to be representative nor did it aim at preparing monographs 
of the collective bargaining process at industry-level. Above all it reflected the desire to 
highlight the characteristics of two forms of enterprise wage regulation: in one case, com-
pany-level regulation appears dominant; in the other, it is non-existent. Workplaces whose 
profiles are typical of some industries were then targeted: a large and long-established 
company in the automotive industry on the one hand, on the other, younger and medium 
size companies operating in the service sector (four call service centre providers). While 
the first industry is marked by a strong tradition of social dialogue at company level, the 
other is, in contrast, characterised by a weak institutionalization of labour relations. In 
addition to interviews with union representatives of the French Democratic Confederation 
of Labour (CFDT) involved in mandatory annual collective bargaining on wages, we 
exploited collective agreements at the automaker from 2000 concerning wages, employee 
savings plans, profit-sharing. The most recent wage and social audits were also utilized. 
Union representatives interviewed at the call service centre providers were not allowed to 
disclose such documents. However, much information (social audits, wage agreements, 
definitions of bonuses) for two of the four calling service centres have been transmitted 
to us. Management and human resource officials in both fields studied were contacted but 
did not wish to participate in the survey.
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French workplaces. The second part extends the statistical analysis by establishing the 
relative weights of company and industry-level collective bargaining in two industries 
–automotive construction and call service centres. The third part analyses the themes 
of two levels of collective bargaining, the industry and company levels, and examines 
the differentiation in the content of the collective bargaining according to the levels of 
wage regulation. Finally, the last part concerns the existence of other levels of wage 
regulation. Two areas are discussed here: the weight of the individual level, namely 
the relation between the employee and his direct supervisor in a context of rising 
individualised compensation, and the significant influence of actors who are external 
to the company, in this case contractors and the head companies in business groups.
Construction of a Typology of Forms of Wage Regulation
According to the REPONSE 2004-2005 survey, collective bargaining, or discus-
sions on wages with employee representatives or with employees, occurred in nearly 
43% of workplaces of 20 or more employees (for a discussion of that figure, see 
Box 2). About six out of ten employees (58%) were concerned. At the same time, the 
survey questioned the management representatives on the importance they placed on 
branche-level recommendations in making decisions to increase wages. Over 58% of 
them said they took such recommendations into account, giving them a primary role 
in 30% of cases (which corresponds to 59% and 28% respectively of employees in 
the field). In the following article, we consider the existence of collective bargaining 
at the workplace level and the place given to branche recommendations as indicators 
of the weight given to company-level collective bargaining on the one hand, and to 
the industry level, on the other.7
Another point in the survey questioned management representatives about the 
applicable convention collective.8 Responses can be grouped by convention col-
lective, but given the small number of workplaces in the sample for some conventions 
7. Other survey questions shed light on the role of the branche. They cover reference to a job classification or the 
details of subjects referenced in the collective agreement. However, the question of the weight of branche level 
recommendations concerning wage increases plays a pivotal role. It clearly illustrates the company’s position relative 
to its applicable convention collective. This point was emphasized by Annette JOBERT (2003) in a field study carried 
out in parallel to the analysis of the previous edition of the REPONSE survey. It is unfortunate, however, that the study 
does not differentiate between the recommendations that were the result of collective industry-level agreements and 
those made by the employers’ representatives alone. This prevents us from distinguishing those workplaces reporting 
that they had not taken industry-level recommendations into account either because there was no such agreement, or 
because they did not use it as a reference.
8. Most workplaces declared their applicable Identifiant de convention collective (Collective Agreement Code – IDCC) 
through a multiple choice question whose options were determined upstream by the DARES by branch or industry 
and by workplace. Nevertheless, several hundred workplaces responded in text rather than with the identifying code, 
leading to the recoding of these responses by Thomas AMOSSÉ and Heloise PETIT in an earlier study (AMOSSÉ, PETIT, 
2011). Among the workplaces selected for the survey, 117 reported no applicable collective agreement at industry-level. 
They were excluded from the analysis.
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BOX 2
What Proportion of Workplaces Negotiate Wages?
Given the annual obligation to negotiate wages since the Auroux laws of 1982, the 
fact that less than 43% of workplaces have negotiated may seem surprising. The DARES 
provides an “adjusted” statistic excluding cases in which the absence of negotiations is 
linked to the implementation of past agreements, industry-level agreements, or existing 
regulations in the public service, or when it is due to a unilateral decision by management 
or the lack of worker representatives. In 50% of workplaces, collective bargaining has 
taken place at some level (including the company or business group), which remains 
relatively low. These figures reflect the fact that the annual obligation to negotiate may not 
be respected, but it is also because it does not apply to companies without union delegates. 
Such companies represent 48% of the sample of the REPONSE survey. Among companies 
with a trade union representative, 66% negotiated wages in 2004. The size of the company 
is another key criterion since the appointment of union delegates is much rarer in companies 
with fewer than 50 employees. Among workplaces belonging to companies with more 
than 50 employees and having a trade union representative (37% of workplaces), 70% of 
management representatives say they have discussed or negotiated wages.
The questionnaire also included a question on the reasons for the absence of nego-
tiation so as to better understand the situation of those workplaces reporting not having 
negotiated wages. Three reasons were given by management representatives: in 30% of 
cases, this was a unilateral decision by management; in 29% of cases, the lack of nego-
tiation was linked to the implementation of an industry agreement, and in 24% to the lack 
of demand on the part of employees.
In most cases where negotiations took place they led to agreements either signed by 
all participants (51%) or only signed by some of them (19%). In one quarter of workplaces 
(26%), wage negotiations ended with a unilateral decision of the employer.
Due to differences in scope and because it surveyed companies and not workplaces, 
the Acemo survey (Survey on the Activity and the Conditions of Employment of the 
Workforce) which investigated collective bargaining and employee representation in 
2007 provided different results to questions which, nevertheless, were similar to those 
of REPONSE. According to CARLIER and NABOULET (2009), only 14% of companies 
negotiated in 2007 regardless of the subject matter. The Acemo survey, based on a sample 
of firms with more than ten employees, has a greater number of small companies, while the 
workplaces in REPONSE often belong to large business groups which are more likely to 
have held negotiations. These facts, plus taking into consideration only those agreements 
which were actually signed, explain the discrepancy with the figures provided by Sanvi 
AVOUYI-DOVI, Denis FERN and Erwan GAUTIER (2009). According to them, less than 25% 
of employees –no matter what the size of the company in which they work– were covered 
by a company agreement on wages and bonuses in 2004 while, according to the REPONSE 
2004-2005 survey, collective bargaining on wages at the company level involved 58% of 
employees in workplaces of 20 or more employees.
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collectives, some combinations have been necessary. We have utilised the analytical 
table of the Conventions regroupées pour l’information statistique (Combined 
Agreements for Statistical Information – CRIS) developed by the DARES. The first 
level of combination synthesises information and organizes our analysis on conventions 
collectives, classified into 25 professional branches.
Our goal is to synthetically present the different types of wage regulation in 
French workplaces. We performed a hierarchical cluster analysis from the variables 
indicating, for each branche, the share of workplaces where negotiations on wages had 
taken place and the weight that management representatives had given to industry-level 
recommendations (primary, secondary, unimportant). In doing so, we found it possible 
to distinguish three profiles of branches describing as many forms of interrelationship 
between the two levels of collective bargaining, at the company and the industry levels 
(see Table 1).










Existence of wage collective bargaining or discussions
Yes 55.1 36.4 31.6 42.7
Role of industry-level recommendations
Primary 27.8 16.3 59.1 28.9
Secondary 39.1 24.0 14.1 27.9
Not important 30.2 53.8 21.8 38.6
Industrial branches concerned
−  metallurgy and 
steel;
−  chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals;
−  plastics, rubber 
and fuels;
−  glass and building 
materials;
−  agro-food;
−  banking and 
insurance;
−  real estate.
−  non-food retail 
commerce;
−  hotels, cafes, restaurants;
−  legal professions;
−  wood and wood 
products;
−  clothes, leather, textiles;
−  consultants and business 
service providers;
−  culture and 
communication;
−  wholesale commerce;
−  teaching and related 
activities;
−  company-level collective 
agreements.
−  construction and 
civil engineering;
−  food distribution;
−  cleaning activities 
and security;
−  health and social 
work;
−  special status 
institutions (SNCF, 
EDF, RATP).
% of workplaces 41.9 30.7 27.3 100
% of employees 49.4 25.8 24.8 100
Note: The sums of the terms of specific variables are not 100% due to non-responses in the survey.
Interpretation: The “non-negotiated wage regulation” profile covers 30.7% of workplaces. Some 36.4% of workplaces of this clas-
sification said they had discussed or negotiated wages in 2004 and this proportion is below the average (42.7%). Some 53.8% of these 
institutions consider branch or industry level recommendations as unimportant (more than the sample average of 38.6%).
Field: Workplaces of 20 or more employees in the non-agricultural business sector.
Source: REPONSE 2004-2005 survey, “Management Representatives” questionnaire, DARES.
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Having constructed a typology, we utilised a number of variables from the 
REPONSE survey to describe the wage regulation profiles and identify their main 
distinguishing features. We took into account the structural characteristics of work-
places (size, legal structure), the presence or the absence of union representatives 
within them, their economic position, and criteria for revaluations of wages advanced 
by management representatives.9 Our goal is to describe the highlighted profiles “all 
things not being equal”. Without attempting to define the reasons for belonging to 
a particular profile, our analysis provides a heuristic interpretation of the forms of 
interrelationship between bargaining levels.
First Profile: Mixed Wage Regulation
The first profile, of mixed wage regulation, includes a relative majority of almost 
42% of workplaces and over 49% of employees. It includes the following branches: 
“metallurgy and steel”, “chemicals and pharmaceuticals”, “plastics, rubber and fuels”, 
“glass and building materials”, “agro-food” and “banking and insurance”. It is marked 
by the significant weight of both levels of collective bargaining: 55% of workplaces 
reported having negotiated wages and they are also more likely than average to take into 
account the industry’s recommendations, although they are often considered (by 39% 
of workplaces) to be of secondary importance. Company-level bargaining often focuses 
on employee savings plan and social insurance schemes in addition to wages. The 
intensity of wage negotiations is related to a relatively high union density –companies 
in which the proportion of unionised employees exceeds 10% of the workforce are 
typical of this profile– and to the more frequent presence of union delegates.
This regulation profile is characteristic of large workplaces (over 100 employees) 
employing few women, often in manufacturing industry (or in the banking and insurance 
sector). They have relatively high sales revenue (between 10 and 100 million euros) and 
have functioned continuously for a considerable period of time (often over 20 years) 
on a large scale market (at least national). They are usually subsidiaries, belonging to 
a business group, whose business activity is part of a multi-level subcontracting chain. 
Outsourcing activities often account for at least 50% of their revenue while they are 
also subcontractors themselves. These establishments report having greater difficulty 
in forecasting their activity and setting targets for profitability and growth in market 
share. Priority criteria in decisions to increase wages are their financial results and 
their concerns in maintaining a healthy social climate.
9. See Table A1 in the appendix for a complete presentation of these variables. In the description of profiles, we strive 
to highlight the main features that stand out as typical, that is, when the proportions observed for a given variable are 
very different from the average.
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Second Profile: Non-Negotiated Wage Regulation
The second profile, non-negotiated wage regulation, involves 31% of workplaces 
and more than 25% of employees. While quite diverse, workplaces in this profile 
nevertheless have a common origin in service sectors with a weak tradition of collective 
bargaining such as “hotels, cafes, restaurants”, “consultants and business service pro-
viders”, and “culture and communication”. This profile is marked by weak collective 
bargaining activity at both levels: only 36% of workplaces have had negotiations on 
wages and over half do not attribute any importance to industry recommendations. 
Frequently advanced explanations for the absence of wage bargaining at the workplace 
level are the employer’s unilateral decision or the lack of demand by employees. The 
presence of union delegates is rare and unionisation rates are low (less than 5% of 
employees).
Workplaces are typically smaller, with less than 50 employees, and they are older, 
with over 20 years continuity. They are often subsidiaries of business groups listed on 
the stock exchange. They also report less frequently to have acted as subcontractors.10 
Profitability is one of the main strategic objectives of these workplaces. Instructions 
from the head company and increases in the statutory minimum wage frequently weigh 
on decisions to increase wages. On the average, the workforce is female, young, skilled 
(with many managerial, professional and intermediate professions), and stable, with 
the proportion of temporary contracts and Fixed-Term Contracts (Contrats à durée 
déterminée – CDD) being rather low. Individual characteristics, however, are very 
different from one activity to another. The example of the category “consultants and 
business service providers” is significant: it consists primarily of engineering activities 
and research and development, where the workforce is highly qualified. But it also 
includes activities such as call service centres where skill levels are lower.
Third Profile: Wage Regulation by Industry
The last profile, wage regulation by industry includes more than 27% of workplaces 
and almost 25% of employees. It is typical of branches such as “construction and civil 
engineering”, “food distribution”, “cleaning activities and security”, and “health and 
social work”. Over 59% of management representatives consider the recommendations 
of the industry as essential and only 31% of them have negotiated wages: this profile is 
marked by the preponderant weight of the collective agreement at industry level with 
very few workplace negotiations. The weakness of social relations in the workplace is 
explained by the fact that there are frequently no union representatives. The dominance 
of the industry level also seems to be accepted by the management representatives since 
10. This feature should be interpreted with caution. The workplaces in question are often providers whose services 
are dedicated to companies. In many cases, the services provided are directly designed in conjunction with the client 
and can be likened to a subcontracting relationship (as defined by the French Standards Agency [Agence française de 
normalisation – AFNOR], see PERRAUDIN et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the concept of outsourcing is often reserved for 
the industry by the actors themselves, which must be taken into account in reading our results.
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they are particularly likely to justify the lack of company negotiations by pointing to the 
application of an industry-level agreement. In addition to references by management 
representatives to collective, that is to industry-level, agreements, they also noted that 
changes in the minimum wage played a central role in decisions to increase wages.
Workplace size is not a distinguishing characteristic of this profile. However, 
such workplaces are more often independent, with modest sales revenue (less than 
five million euros) and operating in a local market. Employees’ work safety is often a 
strategic issue of these companies. This regulating profile is typical of establishments 
employing an unskilled, unstable, and very feminine work force: the proportion of 
managerial and professional employees and intermediate professionals is often less 
than 15% of the workforce, with women making up over 70% of the total. Frequently, 
more than 5% of the employees of given establishments work on fixed term (CDD) 
or temporary contracts.
Our cluster analysis reveals the diversity in the possible forms of interrelationship 
between collective bargaining at the industry level and at the company level. Using 
a representative survey has the advantage of drawing an overall picture of wage 
regulation modes among French companies. It nevertheless has the disadvantage of 
not being able to directly represent the collective and individual activity within the 
establishment. The case studies here are complementary and help make a specific 
analysis of how company wage bargaining is conducted and a clearer understanding 
of the company’s position in its relationship to the industry level.
Actors’ Strategies and Wage Negotiation Process 
at a Car Manufacturer and Four Call Service Centres
The two situations studied, that of a car manufacturer and of the calling service 
centre providers, can be respectively considered as belonging to the statistical profiles 
of mixed wage regulation and non-negotiated wage regulation.
The third profile, marked by the weakness of company-level collective bargaining 
and the weight of regulation at the industry level is typical of what has long been 
considered the most common case in the French labour market. As such, it has been 
the subject of numerous industry monographs. These include the work led by Annette 
JOBERT (2003) in which the author distinguishes several conventions collectives marked 
by the weight and dynamic of collective bargaining at industry level. The profile that 
emerges here is similar to that of wage regulation by industry. In both cases we find the 
branches of construction and civil engineering, and of the cleaning industry. JOBERT 
(2003) combines her statistical work with a field study from which she concludes that 
the prominent weight of the industry level 
“is based on the belief shared by the different actors that the branche remains the 
relevant level for the regulation of industrial relations, given the characteristics of the 
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industry and the weakness of collective bargaining at the company level. Displacing 
negotiations to the company level is looked at as a marginal phenomenon which 
should be of limited scope” (p. 13). 
With a different perspective, we can also refer to the work of Jean-Michel DENIS (2008) 
on the cleaning industry.
Fundamentals of Mixed Wage Regulation in the Automotive Industry
The case study in the automotive industry centres on a very large company owned 
by a holding company created in the 1960s and which, in the following decade, bought 
up several other automotive manufacturers.11 Today, this business group, which has 
employees in many countries, includes an automotive manufacturer –the heart of 
its activity– and four other activities: a bank, a group devoted to the engineering 
and production of automotive equipment, a transportation and logistics group, and 
finally a motorcycle manufacturer. While this group had a program in France until the 
mid-2000s of recruiting managers and professionals, the company reduced its overall 
workforce by 16% between 1999 and 2009. In 2009, it employed 70,580 employees, of 
whom 19% were managerial and professional employees, 20% white collar employees, 
technicians and supervisors (Employés, techniciens et agents de maîtrise – ETAM) and 
60% blue collar workers. At the time of the survey, the group intended to continue its 
downsizing policy in France by closing several plants.
The analysis of wage collective bargaining demonstrates the similarities of the 
automaker’s profile to that of the mixed wage regulation. While negotiators at the annual 
company wage negotiations are aware of the industry level recommendations, these 
in fact carry little weight in their decisions. Here, the basic reference for managerial 
and professional employees is the national convention collective for engineers and 
managerial and professional employees in the metal-working industries of 13 March 
1972. ETAM and blue collar workers are under the jurisdiction of the convention 
collective of the metal-working industry or local agreements such as the convention 
collective in the metallurgical, mechanical, and related industries in the Paris region 
of 16 July 1954.
In addition to the statistical profile described above, the automotive manufacturer 
demonstrated a very pronounced degree of autonomy in its relations with the branche 
during mandatory annual collective bargaining, probably because it plays an important 
role in the industry. Above all, it belongs to that category of companies –large companies 
affiliated to the Union of Metal-Working Trades and Industries (Union des industries et 
des métiers de la métallurgie – UIMM, formerly the Union of Metallurgical and Mining 
Industries)– which has historically had great autonomy of action in France (FRABOULET, 
2007). In terms of wage policies, the manufacturer’s autonomy is primarily reflected in 
11. The holding company is a corporation, which generally has very few employees and establishes a central pole 
for the management of several companies in which it holds a majority stake. It is a specific form of a business group’s 
parent company.
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the fact that the timetable fixed earlier in the year by the business group’s management 
is independent of events outside the group, such as changes in the national minimum 
wage or industry-level minima. In fact, the automaker pays wages superior to both 
these minima. Between 2001 and 2009, the overall wage increase exceeded 18% while 
the value of the point defined in the metallurgical industry’s convention collective of 
blue collar workers, white collar employees, technicians, and supervisors (OETAM) 
in the Paris region rose by just over 5% over the same period.12 Relying primarily on 
the preceding evolution of sales for the automotive industry, management studies the 
wage policies of its main competitors and indicates during the negotiations either that 
it is ready to be generous, or that, as part of the group’s general policy of reducing the 
number of employees in France, it cannot do better.
This relative autonomy in terms of pay decisions was also found in the manufac-
turer’s jobs classification. The latter, built on the basis of the metallurgy agreement 
of June 1974, was amended in the mid-2000s.13 The company’s OETAM classifi-
cation guarantees a higher career salary compared to that of the convention collective. 
Employees start at a higher coefficient (170, not 140), above both the minimum wage 
(for example, around 100 euros more per month in 2009) as well as the industry-level 
minima, and reach higher coefficients (240 and not 215 or 225). Technicians and 
supervisors start at coefficient 255 (and not at 215). On the other hand, the proliferation 
of intermediate coefficients –four intermediate coefficients (185, 195, 200, and 320) 
have been created– is intended to slow career advancement and in doing so to create 
a wage system specific to the company.
There is a large degree of autonomy for company negotiations compared to that of 
the industry-level covering decisions on adjusting both wages and job classifications. 
This type of business practice diverges from the traditional model of organization of 
labour relations in France. JOBERT (2003) also considers that the convention collective 
of metallurgy is typical of a “transformation of the branche level regulation.” But 
the role of the branche has not disappeared: it is still the reference, even if it is only 
to have a better measure of one’s differences with it. As noted by Jacky FAYOLLE et 
al., (2005) in the case of large companies in the automobile industry, it is part of a 
“minimum distribution of advances on pay and classifications” (pp. 46-47). The idea of 
a reference, although present but secondary, seems appropriate. It is entirely different 
in the call service centre providers.
12. Multiplied by a coefficient, the point value determines the minimum wage for each hierarchical position for a 
weekly schedule of 35 hours.
13. The national agreement is dated July 1975, but the agreement between the UIMM and the trade unions which laid 
the foundations of the new classification grid is dated 28 June 1974 (EYRAUD, 1978).
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Non-Negotiated Wage Regulation: the Case of Call Service Centres
A summary of the four call service centres studied (see Box 3) shows that the 
mandatory annual negotiation is part of an organizational strategy of the group to 
which each centre belongs.
The four call service centre providers have contrasting situations but can be clas-
sified as being in the non-negotiated wage regulation profile: collective bargaining at 
neither the industry nor the company level seem to play a leading role in fixing wages. 
While these characteristics appear in the statistical definition of the corresponding 
profile, the analysis of the actual situation of call service centre providers highlights 
how this can lead to minimising the issues of wage bargaining. Compared to the 
case of the automotive manufacturer, wage bargaining here seems to have marginal 
importance. Instructions from headquarters are more decisive in decisions to increase 
wages than the mandatory annual negotiation itself. Attention is paid to industry-level 
BOX 3
Presentation of the Four Call Service Centres Studied
The first client contact centre is a French group which operates worldwide. In 2009, the 
company was reorganized leading to the development of a parent company, composed of 
managerial and professional employees heading four operating companies in metropolitan 
France. The parent company signed an agreement on this occasion establishing a Unité 
économique et sociale (Economic and Social Group – UES) involving five companies. Each 
one had its own mandatory annual negotiations, making five separate wage negotiations for 
the group. In early 2009, the client contact centre studied had a workforce of about 6,800 
of whom 80% were employees, 12% supervisors and 8% managers.
The second client contact centre also belongs to a French group. This group has 100% 
ownership of one company located in France as well as of another located in Morocco. 
Employees are spread across a dozen sites in France and two sites in Morocco. In France, 
more than 3,300 employees were listed in late 2009, some 96% of whom were ETAM 
and 4% managers.
The third client contact centre belongs to a major outsourcing group. The group, 
based in France, has six sites in France, a site in Tunisia and a site in Spain. It employs 
approximately 2,500 employees (half of them at the French sites). In 2009, the workforce 
at the six French sites consisted of approximately 82% semi-skilled or unskilled white 
collar employees, 13% supervisors and 5% managerial and professional employees. This 
call service centre, like the second example studied, holds one single mandatory annual 
bargaining session at its headquarters.
The fourth and last contact centre studied is headquartered and has its primary site in 
the Paris region, to which six additional sites –financially and legally autonomous– were 
gradually added between 2003 and 2009. The company operates seven contact centres close 
to Paris. It says it has decided not to develop offshore. It employs approximately 3,300 
people and holds a mandatory annual negotiation session for each centre.
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bargaining but the results are usually limited to the strict respect of changes in the 
minimum wage which in fact play a central role in collective bargaining at both the 
industry as well as the company level here (CASTEL, 2012). The timing of negotiations 
is strategically thought out and based on decisions on the national statutory minimum 
wage: negotiations begin in the spring before the revaluation of the SMIC (minimum 
wage) on 1st July (until 2009). This has caused some degree of frustration among union 
delegates who had previously negotiated increases which were subsequently exceeded 
by the increase in the minimum wage.
There has not been a consistent schedule of wage bargaining at the industry level 
since 1999 within the framework of the convention collective of 13 August 1999 
entitled “Service Providers in the Service Sector” which is the convention collective 
of reference for the four cases studied. A priori, wage agreements or amendments 
are signed annually. They are not systematically étendu (extended)14 –this is notably 
the case of the agreements of November 2009 and January 2011– even though the 
implementation of an accord is frequently determined by its extension (SALMON, 
KRYNEN, 1993). In the best of cases, when the extension does take place, it becomes 
effective after two months –as with the agreements of September 2007 and that of 
September 2011. In most cases it is effective between five and eleven months following 
the signature of the agreement or amendment, which may help postpone future wage 
negotiations. It can thus be assumed that the fact that no agreements were reached in 
2002, 2004, 2006, and 2010 is the result of a long negotiation process followed by the 
extension of the agreements.
On job classifications, call service centre providers comply with the benchmark 
employment classification grid of the “service providers” convention collective, and, 
while some of them set up specific company grids, they do so within this framework 
as allowed by the collective agreement. Compliance with the job classification pro-
vided in the collective agreement does not prevent the call service centres from being 
autonomous in setting the rules for promotions. One of the call service centres studied, 
for example, applies its company job classification at the frontier between semi-skilled 
or unskilled employees and supervisors by creating a post of “assistant chef d’équipe” 
(assistant shift supervisor). This category fits in between the “supervisor” and that of 
the “chef de projet junior” (junior project manager), present in the collective agreement 
classification. This has become an obligatory step in the case of internal promotion 
from employee status to that of foreman or supervisor. Another centre organizes a 
transition to the “supervisor” category on the basis of an individual interview after 
four years as a téléconseiller (telephone consultant). Thus, client contact centres 
generally adopt the job classification of the “providers” collective agreement while 
modulating the methods of promotion. They respect the scale of minimum wages 
when the agreement is extended. When it is not, employers who are members of the 
14. A specific agreement is said to be “extended” when it is made mandatory for all employers within the branche. 
Therefore, employers who are members of the organizations which have signed the specific agreement are not the 
only ones required to implement it.
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organizations which have signed the collective agreement can arrange to postpone 
application of the agreement for a few months “for reasons of competitiveness”.15
We can assume that affiliation to a particular convention collective for call service 
centre providers is akin to a strategic choice guided by a cost minimisation objective. 
The so-called “integrated” call service centres (because they are incorporated into large 
companies) are mostly under the authority of the convention collective of the telecom-
munications industry of 26 April 2000. Meanwhile, call service centre providers which 
were so-called “externalisés” (outsourced) and had been created through restructuring, 
mergers and acquisitions, were then attached to the “Syntec”, the convention collective 
of 15 December 1987 applicable to the staff of technical design offices, consulting 
engineering firms and consulting companies. The companies studied are today under 
the authority of the national agreement of “service providers” of 13 August 1999. But 
the latter agreement offers fewer benefits to employees than those of the “Syntec” and 
of telecommunications. Benefits present in the “Syntec”, such as vacation bonuses, 
for example, and the 100% wage increase for work on public holidays and Sundays, 
do not exist in the “service providers” agreement.16 National agreements for gross 
minimum wages for ETAM workers (employees, technicians and supervisors) under 
the “Syntec” are higher than those of ETAM workers under the “service providers in 
service sector” agreement of 13 August 1999.
Our analyses point to the existence of a multiplicity of wage regulations that can 
result in as many different forms of interrelationship between industry and company 
negotiations. In this, they confirm the results of previous studies on the diversity of the 
role of the branche (see especially JOBERT, 2003; SAGLIO, 1991). They are distinguished 
by stressing the role of company collective bargaining in wage regulation: these seem 
to outweigh the industry level in certain cases, particularly in the mixed regulation 
profile. This result supports the hypothesis of the loss of legitimacy of the branche 
in the French system of wage regulation (JOBERT, 2003). Should we conclude that 
the branche is now everywhere in retreat? No, on the contrary it retains a dominant 
place in some cases, as shown with the wage regulation by industry profile. And the 
study of the experience of wage negotiations in four call service centres and at a car 
manufacturer also points out that in terms of remuneration, it is impossible to ignore 
the industry level even where this level does not prove determinant in the mandatory 
annual negotiations.
15. The long period of the extension procedure compared to the general tendency of around three months (Ministère 
du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la Santé, 2012, p. 239), is probably linked to the role played by the national minimum 
wage at call centre service providers. The wait-and-see policy of the representatives of employers’ organizations 
vis-à-vis the application of wage agreements and the calendar of these extensions are not just a matter of competition 
between companies. It is also a strategy vis-à-vis their bargaining partners since any increase in the national minimum 
wage limits the scope of the wage agreement, extended or not, on which they have agreed. Conversely, for employee 
representatives, a rapid extension allows them to justify their work in the branch or industry level negotiations even 
outside of those companies in which their organization operates, before a possible increase in the minimum wage 
wipes out the results obtained through their negotiations.
16. Note that the law does not provide for increased wages for work on Sunday. However, collective or company 
agreement may provide for such an increase.
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This first part of the article has allowed us to outline three typical ideal forms 
of interrelationship between the two levels of collective bargaining. In line with the 
work of SELLIER (1993), we can assume that the diversity of modes of interrelationship 
thus presented corresponds to the variety of actors’ strategies in their construction and 
confrontation.
Industry and Company: Negotiating with Different Content
The use of the REPONSE survey and case studies enables us to broaden the 
analysis of the interrelationship of company and industry-level collective bargaining 
and the study of their contents.
What is Negotiated and Where?
The REPONSE survey provides a fairly accurate picture of the content of industry 
and company-level negotiations. A survey question lists the topics which management 
representatives consult in industry-level collective agreements. We used the answers 
to this question as indicators of the content of industry-level negotiations.17 The most 
frequently cited issue was working time (see Table A2 in the Appendix), but this result 
should be interpreted as taking into account the date of the survey and the move to the 
“35 hours” workweek. Three out of ten themes raised in the questionnaire are directly 
related to wages: the determination of the wage hierarchy of job classifications; the 
calculation of bonuses; and employee savings schemes (see Table 2).18 The first two are 
frequently mentioned (nearly two out of three establishments cite the wage hierarchy of 
job classifications) while employee savings schemes are discussed only infrequently. 
Other issues potentially related to wage policies are also defined in reference to the 
convention collective, including supplementary pensions and occupational equality (in 
more than two thirds of workplaces), although management representatives say that 
they only rarely consult the national agreement on these points (see Table A2 in the 
Appendix). These results reinforce what has been observed in relevant field studies: the 
industry level collective agreement is mainly utilised in defining general and long-term 
principles starting with the wage hierarchy of job classifications.
17. As shown in Table 2, the weak reference to the collective agreement on a specific theme (a small proportion of 
“yes” responses) is always associated with the fact that very often the convention collective did not even mention it. 
The weak reference to the collective agreement therefore stresses that industry level agreements are rare on this theme.
18. This concerns a priori “fixed” bonuses such as seniority or thirteenth month bonuses (cases explicitly mentioned 
in the survey questionnaire).
Nicolas Castel, Noélie Delahaie, Héloïse Petit
48  – Travail et Emploi – 2015 Special Edition
TABLE 2 –  Frequency of Reference to an Industry Level Collective Agreement Concerning Wages, 











Yes 63.1 50.3 59.7 58.2
No, although the industry-level collective 
agreement deals with this theme 11.3 10.3 11.6 11.1
No, the industry-level agreement does not 
deal with this theme 21.0 32.3 25.9 25.8
Determining the wage hierarchy
Yes 66.3 60.8 76.8 67.5
No, although the industry-level collective 
agreement deals with this theme 14.1 14.5 9.3 12.9
No, the industry-level agreement does not 
deal with this theme 12.8 16.8 10.5 13.4
Employee savings schemes
Yes 34.3 27.1 29.9 30.9
No, although the industry-level collective 
agreement deals with this theme 14.3 10.0 11.9 12.5
No, the industry-level agreement does not 
deal with this theme 41.9 52.8 50.7 47.6
% of workplaces 41.9 30.7 27.3 100
% of employees 49.4 25.8 24.8 100
Note: The sums of the terms of specific variables are not 100% due to non-responses in the survey.
Interpretation: 41.9% of workplaces have a mixed wage regulation profile. Among these establishments, 63.1% report consulting 
an industry level collective agreement for the calculation of bonuses and this proportion is higher than the sample average (58.2%).
Field: Workplaces of 20 or more employees in the non-agricultural business sector.
Source: REPONSE 2004-2005 survey, “Management Representatives” questionnaire, DARES.
Another question of the REPONSE survey clarifies the content of company level 
negotiations (see Table 3). For more than two thirds of those management representa-
tives who reported having discussed or negotiated wages in 2004 the evolution of the 
TABLE 3 –  Topics Covered During Company Negotiations, by Wage Regulation Profile 
In %








% of workplaces having held collective 
bargaining or discussions 55.1 36.4 31.1 42.7
Topics negotiated
Evolution of the overall wage bill 74.1 64.9 49.3 66.7
Bonuses 43.2 41.5 40.4 42.2
Share of individual wage increases 43.3 39.8 34.9 40.7
Criteria for individual wage increases 30.2 30.7 28.1 29.9
Note: The sums of the terms of specific variables are not 100% due to non-responses in the survey.
Interpretation: 74.1% of workplaces characterised by a mixed regulation profile that negotiated salaries also negotiated the evolution 
of the overall wage bill. This proportion is greater than the sample average (66.7%).
Field: Workplaces of 20 or more employees in the non-agricultural business sector.
Source: REPONSE 2004-2005 survey, “Management Representatives” questionnaire, DARES.
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overall wage bill was the major issue. This was followed by the question of bonuses 
and themes linked to individualisation: first, the share of individual increases, followed 
by their award criteria.
In general, the statistical analysis of the content of negotiations shows a clear 
difference between the topics covered at the company level and those discussed at 
the industry level. This difference echoes the distinction reported by SAGLIO (1986, 
1999, 2007) between the roles of wage regulation, which is vested in industry-level 
collective agreements, and that of wage determination, which is reserved for com-
panies. The branche remains the framework for the determination of the wage hier-
archy, the company remaining the place for discussions on the amount and forms 
of compensation. We thus find that stability in the hierarchy of wage negotiations 
already mentioned by SAGLIO. By combining this information with wage regulation 
profiles, our analyses underline to what degree this division persists while being more 
or less evident according to the forms of interrelationship between industry-level and 
company-level collective bargaining.
Frequent Negotiations at the Company Level Do Not Encroach 
on the Negotiation Themes at Industry Level
The content of collective bargaining in workplaces with a mixed wage regulation 
profile, marked by frequent workplace negotiations, differs little from the overall 
sample. The focus of workplace negotiations on the evolution of the overall wage 
bill (more than 74% of workplaces) is even more pronounced. Discussion on the 
criteria for individual increases remains a minority theme, as it is in the overall sample 
(see Table 3). The industry level collective agreement retains an important role in the 
definition of wage themes: besides the question of the wage hierarchy, workplaces 
are more likely to refer to topics related to bonuses and employee savings schemes.19
Besides this characterisation of the typological profile, the example of the auto-
motive manufacturer, where there is only a limited and non-specific reference to the 
branche, emphasizes that the company’s independence in relation to industry recom-
mendations for wage increases also lies in its ability to define its own job classifications 
and minimum wages and in its particular negotiating timetable. It can also be found 
in the very content of the mandatory annual collective bargaining. There are five 
components negotiated in these negotiations sessions. The three most important are: 
the percentage of the general wage increase, which remains the main objective of the 
negotiations; the percentage of individual increases and promotions; and the increase 
in the guaranteed minimum compensation.
19. While overrepresented, collective bargaining on the topic of employee savings schemes remains a minority 
(34% of concerned establishments with a mixed wage regulation profile) and a frequency nearly half as much as that 
of negotiations on wage hierarchy or bonuses. Where they exist, industry-level negotiations on employee savings 
schemes often involve inter-company savings plans, enabling employers to share costs, since the plans are negotiated 
by a large number of companies.
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The percentage general wage increase at this manufacturer since 2001 has been 
an annual average of about 1.85% with a minimum of 1% in February 2009 and a 
maximum of 2.4% in January 2008. In addition to discussions on the percentage of 
general wage increase, a key issue is to find a minimum acceptable to both parties 
involved: for the general increase to appear significant, those union representatives 
interviewed routinely practice and defend a “limiting minimum policy” whereby the 
overall percentage increase is linked to a guaranteed minimum in absolute value, 
namely a talon, a “stub” or “minimum limit”, of x euros.20 They see this as a “boost” 
to the more modest salaries. For example, during negotiations in 2008, an agreement 
was reached in January on an overall increase of 2.4% with a minimum of 40 euros for 
the OETAM. All employees with a monthly gross salary of less than 2,400 euros were 
therefore guaranteed an extra 40 euros per month, making the increase greater than 
2.4%. The practice of a “minimum limit” is also found in the percentage increase in the 
budget dedicated to individual increases. These percentages vary according to profes-
sional category. Not as large as the general wage increase, their annual average since 
2001 is around 0.7% for the blue collar workers, 0.9% for semi-skilled or unskilled 
white collar employees, and 1.2% for technicians.
The third component of the mandatory annual negotiations, the minimum guar-
anteed annual remuneration, is a legacy of the metallurgy branch.21 The guaranteed 
annual compensation takes into account all amounts subject to social security contribu-
tions except for the seniority bonus. Relatively well accepted today, its structure is 
rarely subject to debate. Between 2001 and 2011, it increased by 37.4% in a period in 
which the consumer price index increased by 18.8%.
Finally, despite their frequency, company-level collective bargaining do not 
encroach on the negotiating themes traditionally assigned to the industry level, starting 
with the wage hierarchy of job classifications. They focus primarily on the forms and 
the actual amounts of compensation.
A Weak Role for Negotiations Does Not Mean a Change in their Content
In the second statistical profile, that of non-negotiated wage regulation, industry-level 
recommendations weigh only slightly, if at all, on decisions to increase wages. Management 
representatives report that they consult an industry-level collective agreement less often 
than the average, no matter what the wage issue considered (see Table 2). The low weight 
of company-level collective bargaining does not, however, alter their content: among the 
workplaces attached to the non-negotiated regulatory profile, topics in fact discussed 
during negotiations were not different from the general norm (Table 3).
20. For the 10 years studied, the “minimum limit” is a common but not systematic practice.
21. This was the national agreement of 19 July 1978 on the establishment of a guaranteed annual remuneration to 
improve the situation of manual workers and, more generally, of workers with lower wages signed by the UIMM and 
the signatory union organizations.
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As we have seen, in the case of call service centre providers, the reference to the 
industry level collective agreement is mainly in the construction of job classification 
and in the application of wage minima for new hires. More generally, the national 
minimum wage (SMIC) tends to replace the branche minima for telephone consultants 
(CASTEL, 2012; CAROLI, GAUTIÉ, 2008). When a base wage increase is enacted in a 
call centre service provider, it is generally limited to the application of an extended 
industry level agreement or, in a case more favourable to employees, prior to a possible 
extension. It should be remembered that mandatory annual collective bargaining do 
not guarantee an increase in wages. These may be frozen. Given the impossibility of 
negotiating an increase greater than the changes in the minimum wage and/or branche 
minima, union delegates turned to acting on fringe benefits, which complicated the 
content of annual negotiations. Indeed, most of those negotiations studied centred on 
the mode of payment of meals at or near the workplace; the limitation of unpaid days 
for illness; an extra day off in case of the death of a relative or of x years of service; 
buying an additional microwave for the refectory, or an increase in a bonus coupled 
with a revision of its award criteria.
Industries Remain the Principal Locus for the Determination 
of Wage Hierarchies
The regulatory role of wages traditionally assigned to the branche is reinforced 
among workplaces characterised by the wage regulation by industry profile: the ref-
erence to the convention collective is particularly frequent in the determination of the 
wage hierarchy for jobs classifications (over 76% of workplaces). However, for other 
wage issues (bonuses and employee savings schemes, see Table 2), the role of the 
industry level does not appear reinforced. Not only is company-level bargaining less 
frequent, but it is also characterised by having relatively less content: negotiations 
concerning the evolution of the overall wage bill and the part of individual wage 
increases are particularly uncommon (see Table 3). A well-documented finding in 
studies on industrial relations shows that due to the limited scope of company-level 
negotiations, the industry level plays a key role in questions concerning wages through 
the definition of the wage hierarchy.
The cross-analysis of forms of wage regulation and the themes raised in negotia-
tions highlights a dividing line in the respective roles of the industry-level and that 
of the company in wage decisions. The distribution of themes defined by reference 
to the industry-level on the one hand, and negotiated at company-level on the other, 
seems particularly stable from one profile to another. This finding once again reminds 
us of the stability of “the set of social standards referred to by the actors as they try to 
evaluate the salary levels offered or accepted” (SAGLIO, 1999, p. 24) that constitutes 
the wage system. But the symmetry between the profiles ends there: while the themes 
in question are the same, their weight in the determination of wages differs from one 
profile to another.
Nicolas Castel, Noélie Delahaie, Héloïse Petit
52  – Travail et Emploi – 2015 Special Edition
Other Relevant Levels of Wage Regulation 
to Take into Account
So far we have paid attention to the collective bargaining at industry level as 
well as that at the company. This goes without saying, of course, in terms of wages 
since they remain the main wage bargaining loci during all the transformations of the 
industrial relations system in France. However, the difficulties in collective bargaining 
brought to our attention by the union representatives interviewed raise questions con-
cerning the relevance and weight of other wage regulation loci. This question arises 
in particular because statistical studies point to a rather limited influence of company 
level negotiations (MEURS, SKALLI, 1997; BRAHAMI, DANIEL, 2004) as well as those 
at the industry level (ANDRÉ, BREDA, 2011; ANDRÉ, 2012) concerning wages. We can 
define a multiplicity of wage regulation loci from the definition of the employment 
contract to the establishment of international rules at the European level or by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). In line with our empirical analysis, two 
regulation levels stand out as playing a major role: a “sub-company” level defined by 
the individualisation of wages, and another, “supra-company”, level defined by the 
influence of economic actors external to the company, in this case contractors and the 
holding or parent companies which are at the head of the business group. Although 
they are not institutionally recognised as places of wage bargaining, as are the industry 
and company levels, they can be understood as suitable loci for discussions of actual 
wage levels.
Role of Contractors and of Group Parent Companies in Wage Regulation
As we have already noted, the REPONSE 2004-2005 survey demonstrates the 
degree to which directives from group headquarters weigh on decisions to increase 
wages, especially when the wage regulation is of a mixed or non-negotiated type. The 
study of wage negotiation practices at call service centre providers and the automotive 
manufacturer suggests that to understand the underlying basis of wage bargaining, it is 
no longer sufficient to simply identify what is happening at the level of the company 
sensu stricto as well as at the industry level. The group or contractor’s role and moti-
vation in managing changes in the overall wage bill are decisive in both field studies, 
even if empirical observation remains difficult since “business confidentiality” in this 
question still prevails (MOTTEZ, 1966).
Major contractors at call service centre providers play a central role in maintaining 
low wages by lowering prices for requested services, even going further than the so 
called “reverse” auctions currently condemned by the actors themselves. Union repre-
sentatives as well as employers agree on one point they take for granted: client contact 
centres have little margin for wage bargaining given the demands of their contractors. 
Negotiations between the call centre and its contractor play a central role in the process 
of wage determination, which is clear from the remarks of the personnel director of a 
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large contractor: “We discuss wages endlessly. Wages, that is the real discussion, that 
is where there is a margin. What does the contractor negotiate with the provider? He 
negotiates a price, the ‘price per hour of production’, what one gets for 60 minutes of 
work on the phone.” With labour costs, depending on the individual case, representing 
between 70 and 80% of call service centre sales revenue, cost competitiveness is central 
and focuses on wage conditions (also demonstrated by Mathieu BÉRAUD et al., 2008). 
This illustrates the potential importance of strict monitoring of industry-level minima 
and, especially for call centre operators, of the national minimum wage.
In addition to the demands made by contractors, the organization of call service 
centres in a group has an influence on the course of collective bargaining and their 
outcome. In one of the groups studied, each production site is financially and legally 
autonomous, and, as such, conducts its own wage negotiations. However, the holding 
company plays a central role, without directly participating, by supporting or opposing 
negotiations. In another call service centre, compulsory annual negotiations for all 
sites are held at the headquarters in the Paris region or at each territorial entity when 
the group decided to divide the French market into several regional areas. Thus union 
delegates’ activities are severely dissuaded and handicapped by the very organizational 
model of the client contact centres. At the head of the group, a leading or parent 
company manages the contracts and distributes them among its production sites, which 
are all autonomous subsidiaries. It thus determines the profits that each site can earn on 
services provided, thereby setting the general framework for the wage policy of each 
local call centre: strict compliance with the minimum wage for the greatest number 
with a strategy of delaying application if possible –which brings us ultimately to the 
decisive role of the state in wage regulation (SELLIER, 1961).
Mandatory annual collective bargaining play a key role in the automotive manu-
facturer’s group, since they take place first and set the tone for subsequent negotiations 
at other subsidiaries, particularly the transporter and the equipment manufacturer, as 
well as at major subcontractors. Prior to any discussion, the group head unilaterally 
fixes the budget allocated to wage increases in the group and union delegates in various 
subsidiaries navigate as best as they can to negotiate within this framework. Except 
for major economic indicators, they have no idea of the group’s flexibility in terms 
of its overall wage bill. They are not “behind the scenes”, as noted by a CFDT union 
representative. Furthermore, there is no coordination with other union representa-
tives participating in other mandatory annual negotiations of the various entities of 
the group. But, in the words of another CFDT union delegate, “the pie is cut for all 
the affiliates of the business group.” It seems that the interdependence thus created 
between subsidiaries produces strong effects of mimicry, whether in terms of trade 
union demands or the wage increase actually won.
Case studies highlight the issues posed in defining the contours and the actors in 
negotiations. At the same time we should keep in mind that on this question it is also 
particularly important to look beyond the workplace. We can clearly see to what degree 
the current questioning of company boundaries is a fundamental problem (PETIT, 
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THÉVENOT, 2006) with which collective bargaining is barely able to come to grips 
(FREYSSINET, 2006).
The Individual Performance Interview: 
Infra-Company-Level Wage Regulation?
Aside from the company boundary issue, the individualisation of pay in the form 
of an individualised increase in base wage or bonuses based on individual perfor-
mance is also potentially destabilising for collective bargaining. According to the 
REPONSE survey, individualisation was highly developed in workplaces in 2004 (see 
Table 4): individualised wage increases and bonuses based on individual performance 
to non-management employees were reported granted in 76% and 55% respectively of 
workplaces (respectively 61% and 56% for managerial personnel). Individualisation 
of pay practices is more or less developed according to the wage regulation profiles, 
especially depending on the weight of the industry level. Thus, the wage regulation 
by industry profile is associated with a less frequent usage of individualised forms 
of compensation at the workplace. On the other hand, individualisation is greater in 
establishments with mixed wage regulation or non-negotiated wage regulation profiles, 
where the role of the industry is not dominant.
TABLE 4 –  Individualised Wage Practices for Managerial and Non-Managerial Personnel, 











Individualised wage increases 
(outside of bonuses) 81.6 63.1 80.0 76.0
Bonuses based on individual performance 52.0 51.2 63.9 55.5
Managerial personnel
Individualised wage increases 
(outside of bonuses) 68.2 45.6 65.3 61.1
Bonuses based on individual performance 60.5 42.9 63.3 56.5
% of workplaces 41.9 30.7 27.3 100
% of employees 49.4 25.8 24.8 100
Interpretation: Among establishments characterised by a mixed regulation profile, 81.6% grant individualised increases to their non-
managerial employees. This proportion is greater than the sample average (76%).
Field: Workplaces of 20 or more employees of the non-agricultural business sector.
Source: REPONSE 2004-2005 survey, “Management Representatives” questionnaire, DARES.
These results support the hypothesis advanced by Dominique MEURS (1996) that 
individualisation strengthens the autonomy of company-level collective bargaining 
in relation to the industry level. However, while company-level collective bargaining 
directly involves the rules governing individualisation –including the criteria for, or the 
share of, individual increases in the overall budget, as with the car manufacturer– the 
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actual amount of the increase received by an employee depends essentially on his 
negotiations with his supervisor and indirectly on management’s margin of manoeuvre 
concerning the overall budget reserved for bonuses. What is crucial here is the annual 
assessment interview, bringing together the employee and his supervisor outside of 
company-based collective bargaining. Indeed, periodic evaluation interviews are 
very common in those institutions which develop individualisation: according to the 
REPONSE survey, about 73% and 69% respectively of workplaces reported having 
conducted such interviews among non-management and management personnel, 
these proportions being still higher in mixed wage regulation or non-negotiated wage 
regulation profiles. They play a decisive role in determining wages for both managerial 
and non-managerial personnel: for each of the two categories of employees, 73% of 
management representatives say that they link changes in wages to the holding of such 
an interview and that link is considered to be direct in almost 45% of cases.
Case studies confirm the weight of individualisation of wages parallel to the devel-
opment of a skills rationale for ETAM22 at the automotive manufacturer as well as the 
development of performance bonuses in call service centres for telephone consultants 
and supervisors. This practice is not new: it has been applied to managers and profes-
sionals for a long time. In this regard, case studies emphasize the degree to which the 
situation of managers and professionals lies outside the scope of collective bargaining. 
The situation of managers and professionals at the automaker is simply not addressed 
during the mandatory annual collective bargaining. As indicated in the convention 
collective agreement for “engineers and managerial and professional employees in 
metal-working industries” of 13 March 1972, managers and professionals are invited 
to “periodically” discuss (usually annually) with their superior concerning promotion, 
career development, and increases in wages.
In theory, compulsory annual negotiations concern all employees, but in reality 
only ETAM are concerned by wage questions discussed at call service centre pro-
viders. Employee representatives have no information about the pay of managers and 
professionals other than a general average. While a general raise benefits the young 
managers and professionals remunerated on the basis of an industry-level minimum, 
each manager and professional is invited, as in the case of metal-working, to negotiate 
“periodically” his compensation with his immediate supervisor. Companies under the 
“providers” convention collective are required to implement a policy to promote career 
development and each manager or professional may sign an individual contract with 
his employer granting more favourable terms than those of the agreement.23
22. This trend, initiated in the mid-1980s, has been well described by BEAUD and PIALOUX (1999, chapter 3).
23. As a reminder that the metal-working industry is an important benchmark in terms of conventions collectives, it 
should be noted that the Article 2.5 “promotion and career development” of the rider to the “providers” convention 
collective is modelled on Article 6 of that in the “engineers and managerial and professional employees in metal-
working industries”.
Nicolas Castel, Noélie Delahaie, Héloïse Petit
56  – Travail et Emploi – 2015 Special Edition
The two field studies clearly show that the challenge of collective bargaining for 
managers and professionals is primarily interpersonal and not collective, as is still the 
case for non-managers. However, even for the latter, this is less and less the case due 
to reversible premiums and the development of a skills rationale.
•
In order to see the interrelationship between collective bargaining at industry or 
at the company level, this article develops a statistical analysis from the REPONSE 
2004-2005 survey, combined with case studies in the automotive industry and at four 
call service centres. We draw three profiles of wage regulation from this survey.
The mixed wage regulation profile which is a majority, today concerns nearly 42% 
of workplaces and 50% of employees. In giving a crucial role to company-level col-
lective bargaining, it stands out from what has been demonstrated in previous studies, 
centred on the branche. The case study from the automotive industry clearly shows the 
degree of autonomy of company-level negotiations, relegating the collective industry-
level agreement to an ever-present but distant reference. Our analysis coincides with the 
thesis of SELLIER (1993) when defining company-level negotiation as the centrepiece 
of the French industrial relations system, at least for some branches or industries. The 
preponderance of company-level bargaining is the result of the actors’ possibility for 
autonomy and action.
In almost a third of companies (and over a quarter of employees), those associated 
with the non-negotiated wage regulation profile, salary adjustment decisions bear 
little relation to collective bargaining, irrespective of their levels. The study of call 
service centres, emblematic of the low-paid, female-dominated service sector, echoed 
this position by highlighting the very low influence of negotiations on wage increase 
decisions.
The final profile, wage regulation by industry, is similar to the classic repre-
sentation of the French system of industrial relations as a system based above all on 
industry-level collective agreements. The specific characteristics of the companies 
concerned and the weakness of the negotiations held there make the industry level an 
important locus of wage regulation, as already noted in numerous studies (JOBERT, 
2003). It is the minority character of this profile (a little over 27% of workplaces and 
nearly a quarter of the employees concerned) which is noticeable today. Can one infer 
that the branche as the level of wage regulation is now in a phase of decline? The study 
of wage bargaining practices at call service centres and at a car manufacturer, although 
typical of profiles where the industry has a secondary role, leads us to give a negative 
answer to this question. In terms of compensation, the industry level cannot simply 
be ignored, even when it is not the decisive element.
The cross-analysis of identified wage regulation profiles and the themes actually 
negotiated confirms the timeliness of the duality at the heart of the concept of wage 
system proposed by SAGLIO: on the one hand, a “conventional” or industry level 
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providing benchmarks and norms, and, on the other hand, a company level as the place 
for discussion of forms and amounts of compensation. The branch or industry therefore 
retains a major role in wage regulation even if the last two decades show a tendency for 
it to erode as a result of a movement of decentralisation of collective bargaining towards 
the company level, as is the case elsewhere in Europe, and this in a context of wage 
moderation (DELAHAIE et al., 2012). For almost a third of workplaces, this translates 
into a wage regulation that has been described as non-negotiated. Meanwhile, the 
ability to determine wages through workplace-level collective bargaining is confronted 
with the growing importance of other loci of wage negotiations: at the infra-company 
level through the relationship between an employee and his immediate superior, and 
at the supra-company level between the employer, on the one hand, and either his 
contractor or the parent company of his business group, on the other.
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APPENDIX










% of sample 41.9 30.7 27.3 100
Workplace characteristics
Size 
Less than 50 employees 60.3 67.5 62.0 63.0
From 50 to 99 employees 20.3 19.3 22.5 20.6
From 100 to 199 employees 11.1 8.2 9.7 9.8
From 200 to 499 employees 6.2 4.2 4.8 5.2
More than 500 employees 2.3 0.9 1.0 1.5
Age of workplace
Less than 5 years 2.7 5.6 4.0 4.0
Between 5 and 9 years 7.0 13.3 10.5 9.9
Between 10 and 19 years 22.5 32.0 25.2 26.2
Between 20 and 49 years 45.3 33.0 41.7 40.5
More than 50 years 22.4 15.1 18.5 19.1
Legal structure
Franchise 1.2 5.4 3.6 3.1
Linked to a business group 2.7 3.9 6.2 3.1
Head of a business group 5.4 4.3 4.3 4.8
Affiliate of a business group 44.2 43.5 24.7 38.7
Belongs to a business group 1.4 1.0 2.0 1.4
Totally independent 44.2 41.3 57.7 47.0
Company listed on the stock exchange
Yes 25.7 29.4 16.8 24.4
No 73.0 70.4 82.7 74.8
Sub-contracting     
Yes, for at least 50% of sales 15.3 8.8 6.5 10.9
Yes, for less than 50% of sales 9.8 6.6 9.9 8.8
No 71.1 80.3 76.1 75.3
Economic and strategic position
Evolution of activity
Increase 55.6 55.9 57.5 56.2
Stability 29.2 24.8 31.7 28.5
Decline 14.8 18.4 9.7 14.5
Difficulty in foreseeing changes in activity 74.5 70.4 62.3 69.9
Exceptional changes in activity 41.3 40.9 39.7 40.7
Sales (in euros)
Less than 5 million 8.3 13.0 38.6 18.1
Between 5 and 10 million 34.7 34.0 28.1 32.7
Between 10 and 100 million 37.3 29.5 19.2 29.9
More than 100 million 19.6 23.3 14.1 19.2
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Specific and quantified company objectives
Profitability 78.4 79.2 62.9 74.4
Growth and market share 67.2 67.8 52.1 63.3
Respect for budgetary considerations 86.0 89.4 89.3 87.9
Wage costs 82.0 83.2 78.2 81.3
Quality 84.3 82.9 87.2 84.7
Security 78.7 76.4 89.3 80.9
Workforce characteristics
% of management and intermediate professionals
Less than 15 % 25.8 20.9 39.7 28.1
From 15 to 30 % 26.9 25.5 25.0 26.0
From 30 to 50 % 21.8 16.1 15.7 18.4
More than 50 % 25.4 36.1 19.2 27.0
% of temporary or agency workers
Less than 5 % 20.6 17.2 11.6 17.1
More than 5 % 19.6   9.5 27.7 18.7
% of employees less than 40 years old
Less than 40 % 23.6 14.5 18.5 19.4
From 40 to 70 % 58.0 36.4 62.0 52.4
More than 70 % 17.5 47.4 19.3 27.2
% of women     
Less than 15 % 29.9 11.6 33.0 25.1
Between 15 and 60 % 56.2 61.0 22.1 48.3
More than 60 % 13.1 25.7 44.6 25.6
% of employees on fixed term contracts (CDD)
Less than 5 % 37.8 34.3 25.4 33.3
More than 5 % 20.4 21.1 36.4 25.0
Variables concerning industrial relations
% of unionisation 
Less than 5 % of employees 54.0 68.6 57.6 59.5
5 to 10 % of employees 20.1 12.0 17.7 16.9
More than 10 % of employees 15.2   7.9 12.4 12.2
Presence of union representatives
At the workplace level 43.8 31.5 36.0 37.9
At the company level 55.4 51.6 48.8 52.4
Note: The sums of the terms of specific variables are not 100% due to non-responses in the survey.
Interpretation: 41.9% of workplaces have a mixed wage regulation profile. Among these workplaces, 60.3% employ fewer than 50 
employees, lower than the overall average (63%).
Field: Workplaces of 20 or more employees in the non-agricultural business sector.
Source: REPONSE 2004-2005 survey, “Management Representatives” questionnaire, DARES.
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Collective Bargaining at Industry and Company-Levels
TABLE A2 –  Frequency of Reference to an Industry-Level Collective Agreement, 










Employment and rules of mobility
Yes 60.3 55.0 70.1 61.3 
No, although the industry-level collective 
agreement deals with this theme 13.4 11.5 11.2 12.2 
No, the industry-level agreement does not 
deal with this theme 21.0 24.1 15.3 20.4 
Working time
Yes 77.8 72.4 84.3 77.9 
No, although the industry-level collective 
agreement deals with this theme 11.2 10.2 8.6 10.2 
No, the industry-level agreement does not 
deal with this theme 8.4 12.7 4.9 8.8 
Work conditions
Yes 66.1 60.2 77.6 67.4 
No, although the industry-level collective 
agreement deals with this theme 10.9   8.3   6.8   9.0 
No, the industry-level agreement does not 
deal with this theme 18.3 25.0 12.8 18.8 
Vocational training
Yes 59.8 52.7 71.5 60.8 
No, although the industry-level collective 
agreement deals with this theme 16.3 13.6 11.5 14.2 
No, the industry-level agreement does not 
deal with this theme 16.4 24.4 13.8 18.2 
Employee representation
Yes 67.5 56.9 72.3 65.5 
No, although the industry-level collective 
agreement deals with this theme 15.7 12.0 10.6 13.2 
No, the industry-level agreement does not 
deal with this theme 11.7 20.3 11.5 14.3 
Occupational equality
Yes 67.1 62.2 75.0 67.7 
No, although the industry-level collective 
agreement deals with this theme 10.3 8.0 6.6 8.6 
No, the industry-level agreement does not 
deal with this theme 15.3 19.3 11.9 15.6 
Supplementary retirement benefits
Yes 68.5 61.0 76.9 68.5 
No, although the industry-level collective 
agreement deals with this theme 8.3 7.8 4.6 7.1 
No, the industry-level agreement does not 
deal with this theme 16.7 21.4 12.8 17.1 
% of workplaces 41.9 30.7 27.3 100
% of employees 49.4 25.8 24.8 100
Note: The sums of the terms of specific variables are not 100% due to non-responses in the survey.
Interpretation: 41.9% of workplaces have a mixed wage regulation profile. Among these workplaces, 60.3% report that they refer to a 
branch or industry level collective agreement for employment and the rules of mobility; this proportion is close to the sample mean (61.3%).
Field: Workplaces of 20 or more employees in the non-agricultural business sector.
Source: REPONSE 2004-2005 survey, “Management Representatives” questionnaire, DARES.
